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Digest:  21st Century Ins. Co. v. Superior 
Court 
Rachel Warren 
Opinion by Chin, J., with George, C.J., Baxter, J., Moreno, 
J., and Corrigan, J.  Concurring Opinion by Kennard, J.  
Concurring Opinion by Werdegar, J. 
Issue 
Should attorney’s fees be included under the made-whole 
rule for med-pay insurance policy reimbursement? 
Facts 
Silvia Quintana sustained personal injuries after an 
automobile accident with a third party.1  Under her med-pay2 
insurance policy, 21st Century Insurance paid Quintana $1,000.3  
Quintana then brought a personal injury claim against the third 
party, which was eventually settled for $6,000.4  To obtain this 
settlement, Quintana incurred approximately $2,100 in attorney 
fees.5  At 21st Century’s request for reimbursement, Quintana 
sent the insurer $600, which amounted to the $1,000 med-pay 
benefit less a pro rata share of the attorney fees.6  The insurer 
accepted this amount as full reimbursement.7 
Subsequently, Quintana brought a class action lawsuit 
against 21st Century.8  Her causes of action alleged a violation of 
Business and Professions Code section 17200, conversion, unjust 
enrichment and declaratory relief.9  Her main argument was that 
the insurer could not require any reimbursement from her, 
because when taking her attorney fees into account, she had not 
 1 21st Century Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 213 P.3d 972, 974 (Cal. 
2009). 
 2 A “med-pay” insurance policy provides medical coverage for the insured’s medical 
expenses caused by an accident. Id.  The amount of coverage is typically low, in exchange 
for lower premiums. Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 974–75. 
 8 Id. at 975. 
 9 Id. 
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yet been made whole.10  Essentially, Quintana’s reasoning was 
that, after subtracting the attorney fees from her $7,000 total 
recovery ($1,000 from med-pay and $6,000 from the settlement) 
she only recovered approximately $4,900.11  This fell short of her 
total actual damages of $6,000, and thus under the made-whole 
rule the insurer was not permitted to request reimbursement.12  
According to Quintana, the made-whole rule is not satisfied, and 
thus reimbursement cannot be sought, unless the insured has 
also recovered the full amount of attorney fees.13  Her claim 
represented a class of similarly-situated California policyholders 
of 21st Century.14 
21st Century then demurred on the complaint on the 
grounds that in California, litigation expenses are not included in 
calculating whether an insured has been made whole.15  Instead, 
21st Century argued that under the common fund doctrine, 
attorney fees should be separately calculated in equitable 
apportionment, with the insurer paying a pro rata portion of the 
fees.16  The insurer maintained that this was consistent with 
both the made-whole rule and the common fund doctrine.17  The 
trial court overruled the demurrer, and the insurer filed a 
petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal.18  In 
granting the writ, the Court of Appeal held that any attorney 
fees incurred by an insured in recovering losses from a third 
party tortfeasor should not be considered when determining 
whether the insured has been made whole for reimbursement 
purposes.19  Accordingly, the Court of Appeal ordered the trial 
court to vacate the judgment and enter an order to sustain 21st 
Century’s demurrer.20  Quintana petitioned the California 
Supreme Court for review.21 
Analysis 
The court catalogued the history of both the made-whole rule 
and the common fund doctrine in California.22  The made-whole 
rule places a limit on when an insurer can invoke its policy’s 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 976–78. 
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reimbursement clause.23  Specifically, the made-whole rule 
provides that there can be no reimbursement until the insured 
has recovered the entire amount of his or her damages.24  The 
court pointed out that the California Court of Appeal has 
previously defined the made-whole rule in such a way that does 
not consider attorney fees,25 and no California court has ever 
specifically held otherwise.26  The common fund doctrine provides 
that a plaintiff who brings an action resulting in the creation or 
preservation of a common fund may recover his or her attorney 
fees out of that common fund.27  This hundred-year-old legal 
theory was extended to insurance law in 1961,28 and has been 
recognized as applicable to insurance reimbursement since 1975 
as a way to avoid unjust enrichment to the insurer.29 
The court noted that in this was a case of first impression 
because California courts have thus far been unclear as to how 
the made-whole rule and common fund doctrine are to be applied 
to attorney fees in the med-pay reimbursement context.30  As an 
example, the court pointed to Plut v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 
where the Court of Appeal held that the insurer is entitled to 
reimbursement only after the insured has recouped his or her 
loss plus “some or all” of the litigation expenses, but failed to 
expand on what “some or all” entailed or discuss the common 
fund doctrine.31  The court also looked to Progressive West Ins. 
Co. v. Superior Court, which held that the made-whole rule does 
apply to reimbursement claims, and that under the common fund 
doctrine, the reimbursement must be reduced by a proportional 
amount of incurred attorney fees.32  As such, thus far California 
cases have not made clear whether the insured is entitled to 
recover some costs under a pro rata common fund doctrine 
theory, or all costs under the made-whole rule.33 
Due to the lack of clarity in California jurisprudence, the 
court looked to other states.34  Unfortunately, a survey of sister 
states was inconclusive, because those states recognizing the 
 23 Id. at 976 (citing Plut v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 85 Cal.App.4th 98, 104 (2000); 
Sapiano v. Williamsburg Nat. Ins. Co., 28 Cal.App.4th 533, 536 (1994)). 
 24 Id. (citing Plut, 85 Cal.App.4th at 104). 
 25 Sapiano, 28 Cal.App.4th at 536–37. 
 26 21st Century, 213 P.3d at 976. 
 27 Id. at 977 (citing Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 57 Cal.App.3d 458, 466 (1976)). 
 28 Id. (citing United Servs. Auto Assn. v. Hills, 109 N.W.2d 174 (Neb. 1961)). 
 29 Id. (citing Quinn v. State of California, 539 P.2d 761 (Cal. 1975)). 
 30 Id. at 978. 
 31 Id. (citing Plut v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 85 Cal.App.4th 98, 105 (2000)). 
 32 Id. at 978–79 (citing Progressive West Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal.App.4th 
263, 276 (2005)). 
 33 Id. at 979. 
 34 Id. 
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made-whole rule for insurance law have yet to reach a consensus 
on the issue.35 
The court next turned to Chong v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., a federal district court decision predicting that California 
courts would be likely to follow jurisdictions holding that 
litigation costs incurred by the insured must be included in 
calculating whether the insured has in fact been made whole.36  
In determining that this was not unfair to the insurance 
company, the federal district court held that the burden of going 
unpaid should fall to the insurer because it is being paid to 
assumed that risk.37  A contrary holding, the district court 
reasoned, would allow an insurer to simply “sit on the sidelines” 
while the insured made the efforts to recover from the third party 
tortfeasor and then reap the rewards to reimbursement.38 
The court found the reasoning of Chong unpersuasive.39  
First, the assumption that the insurance company has assumed 
the risk ignores the limited nature of med-pay insurance 
provisions.40  In exchange for lower premiums, the policy holder 
of a med-pay insurance policy has only contracted for the insurer 
to assume the risk of medial payments; anything beyond this 
exceeds the insurer’s contractual risk.41  Secondly, the “sit on the 
sidelines” rationale was not persuasive because an insurer is 
generally prohibited from intervening in personal injury cases 
and thus could not participate in the lawsuit if it wanted to.42  
Even if the insurer could intervene, it would likely be met by 
resistance from the insured’s attorney.43  Further, the court 
pointed out that the insurer would not have a reason to 
intervene, since it is unlikely that litigation costs would be larger 
than the amount of reimbursement.44  Thus, the court rejected 
Quintana’s implicit reliance on Chong to assert that including 
attorney fees in the made-whole calculation will not give 
policyholders double recovery.45 
 35 Id. at 979–80. 
 36 Chong v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 428 F.Supp.2d 1136, 1147 (S.D.Cal. 
2006). 
 37 Id. at 1145 (quoting Skauge v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. 565 
P.2d 628, 632 (Mont. 1977) (italics omitted)). 
 38 Id. at 1145. 
 39 21st Century, 213 P.3d at 981. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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Finally, the court looked to policy considerations, noting 
again that the primary policy reason for insurance 
reimbursement is to prevent double recovery on the part of the 
insured.46  First, the court found that the collateral source rule 
was not controlling because it addresses the distribution of 
litigation costs as between parties to a lawsuit (the injured party 
and the tortfeasor), and thus was inapplicable as to the 
distribution of litigation costs as between an insured and non-
party insurer.47  The court also rejected Quintana’s reliance on 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as this doctrine does 
not apply to med-pay reimbursement disputes.48  Because med-
pay provisions are express contractual provisions, the court 
refused to read implied terms or impose additional substantive 
duties.49  Moreover, the court pointed out that including attorney 
fees in made-whole calculations would essentially shift the 
burden of paying attorney fees to the insurance companies, 
resulting in the additional costs being passed to consumers 
through increased premiums.50  This would cause med-pay 
insurance to become less accessible to those who need it most.51 
In contrast, the court found that pro rata allocation under 
the collateral source doctrine balances the interests of both the 
insurer and the insured for med-pay reimbursement situations.52  
The insured receives the benefit of lower premiums and may 
retain payments if he or she is unable to recover from the third-
party tortfeasor.53  And, the made-whole rule still guarantees 
that the insured recover the full amount of actual damages before 
reimbursement is claimed.54  So long as it is undisputed that the 
recovery amount adequately compensates the insured, equity is 
satisfied when the insurer reduces the amount of reimbursement 
to account for its fair share of the attorney fees.55 
 46 Id. (citing Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. 465 P.2d 61, 64 n.7 (Cal. 
1970)). 
 47 Id. at 981–82.  The collateral source rule “prohibits the reduction of damages a 
tortfeasor owes to the plaintiff because the plaintiff received compensation from an 
independent source.” Id. (citing Helfend, 465 P.2d at 63). 
 48 Id. at 982 (citing Progressive West Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal.App.4th 
263, 276–81 (2005)). 
 49 Id. at 982. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
Do Not Delete 5/10/2010 12:35 PM 
506 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:501
Holding 
The court affirmed the Court of Appeal.56  The court held 
that attorney fees are not to be included in the made-whole 
calculation, but rather that pro rata apportionment of attorney 
fees between insured and insurer is the better allocation of 
responsibility.57  Therefore, because Quintana did not dispute the 
amount of the med-pay provision payment, nor that the $400 
originally deducted from reimbursement was less than 21st 
Century’s share, 21st Century properly accounted for its pro rata 
share and Quintana had effectively been made whole.58 
Concurrences 
Justice Kennard concurred in the judgment, expanding on 
the reasoning that Quintana’s position was contrary to California 
law.59  Justice Kennard clarified that although Plut v. Fireman’s 
Fund Ins. Co. was imprecise, its statement that reimbursement 
may be sought only when the insured has recovered “some or all” 
of his attorney fees is an accurate reflection of California law.60  
This is because recoupment of “some” of the litigation expenses 
refers to a situation where the insurance payments comprise only 
a portion of the total loss, in which case the insurer will be 
responsible for its pro rata share.61  Recoupment of “all” of the 
litigation expenses refers to a situation where the insurance 
payments is equal to the total loss, in which case the insurer’s 
pro rata share would essentially be 100%.62 
Secondly, Justice Kennard asserted that pro rata allocation 
of attorney fees is more consistent with the “American rule” 
under which each party bears his own litigation costs.63  Justice 
Kennard pointed out that if the burden of attorney fees cannot be 
shifted to the actual tortfeasor, it is inconsistent to allow it to be 
shifted to the insurance carrier.64  Further, equitable 
apportionment is also consistent with similar workers’ 
compensation situations, which also requires pro rata share of 
litigation costs.65  Lastly, Justice Kennard echoed the sentiment 
of the majority in explaining that including attorney fees in the 
made-whole rule would preclude any insurer reimbursement 
 56 Id. at 982–83. 
 57 Id. at 982. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 983 (Kennard, J., concurring). 
 60 Id. at 984 (citing Plut v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 85 Cal.App.4th 98, 105 (2000)). 
 61 Id. at 984. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 984–85 
 64 Id. at 985. 
 65 Id. 
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under med-pay provisions because the average policy limit is 
lower than average litigation costs.66  This would force in an 
increase in the cost of providing med-pay insurance, thus 
resulting in higher premiums.67 
Justice Werdegar filed a separate concurrence to provide 
“alternative rationale” for the court’s conclusion.68  First, Justice 
Werdegar looked to the relationship between subrogation and 
reimbursement, and pointed out that the reason insurers seek 
reimbursement rather than subrogation in personal injury claims 
is because California bars the assignment of personal injury 
claims.69  This is simply a procedural difference, with the 
principles behind reimbursement and subrogation—that the 
insured should not be permitted to received double recovery—
remains identical.70  As such, Justice Werdegar reasoned that 
reimbursement and subrogation cases should have the same 
substantive outcomes.71  Including attorney fees in the made-
whole calculation would yield different results, because under 
subrogation the insurer would recover its payment less its share 
of attorney fees, while under reimbursement the insurer would 
recover nothing.72  But, under the pro rata theory the results 
would be identical, with both subrogation and reimbursement 
resulting in the insured recovering its payment less its share of 
attorney fees.73 
Secondly, Justice Werdegar pointed out that if attorney fees 
were included in the made-whole rule, the amount of 
reimbursement would be dependent on the extent of the insured’s 
attorney fees.74  Since contingency fees vary, this would result in 
disparate treatment of policyholders.75  This causes a med-pay 
policy to effectively convert from medical to legal reimbursement, 
which is not the purpose of med-pay insurance.76 
Legal Significance 
The court’s decision precludes an insured who has received 
med-pay insurance benefits from factoring in his or her litigation 
costs when determining whether he or she has been “made 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 986 (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 987. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 987–88. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 988. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
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whole” by amounts recovered from a third party tortfeasor.  
Instead, once it is undisputed that the insured has received a 
recovery amount satisfying the full amount of actual damages, 
the insured may deduct only a pro rata share of attorney fees 
from the reimbursement amount owed to the insurer. 
